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clan. The court felt that such testimony would have been merely
cumulative.
If the Ohio courts adopt the Forman reasoning, then it becomes
evident that Oleksiw v. WeidenerU4 establishes nothing more than a
new test of fairness. However, if the Oleksiw case was truly decided
upon statutory compliance, it should be of no consequence whether
plaintiff introduces other expert testimony.
The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the subject case and
the other decisions upon which it relied seem to indicate a growing
concern with the burden of procuring expert witnesses imposed upon
a plaintiff in a malpractice suit. In an attempt to partially alleviate
this burden, the courts have established a rule which can be utilized
to avoid a directed verdict for a defendant-physician when a plaintiff
fails to produce expert witnesses. Although plaintiffs' attorneys will
laud this decision, it is doubtful that the medical profession will simi-
larly react. It would not be surprising if the medical profession
were to carry this controversy to the Ohio legislature.
MICHAEL L. RITZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH -
PARENTAL ADVICE ON BIRTH PREVENTION
State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d
635 (1965).
A provision of the Ohio Revised Code,1 enacted by virtue of
the state's police power,2 makes it a crime to contribute to the delin-
quency of a minor. Ohio recently sought to extend the purview of
this statute in order to support the conviction of a mother whose
allegedly criminal conduct consisted solely of imparting advice to
her minor daughter concerning methods of preventing pregnancy.
In State v. McLaughlin,3 the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the
juvenile court conviction of that parent for her use of words alone
because such an application of Section 2151.41' would constitute
an indirect governmental restriction upon free speech which could
not be justified under the first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.5
33 Forman v. Azzura, 23 App. Div. 2d 793, 797, 259 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1965).
342 Ohio St. 2d 147, 207 N.E.2d 375 (1965).
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The evidence in the McLaughlin case disclosed that upon dis-
covering her thirteen year-old daughter's pregnancy, Mrs. Virginia
McLaughlin warned the girl she was not to have future sexual rela-
dons. The mother added, however, that if her daughter did have
sexual relations in the future, she was to be certain that the boys
used protective devices which were available in any drugstore. Less
than a year later, Mrs. McLaughlin learned of her daughter's second
pregnancy and again cautioned the girl not to engage in sexual ac-
tivity. Again, however, she told her daughter .to use protective
methods if she did have such. relations. After the second child was
born, Mrs. McLaughlin's daughter was adjudged a delinquent and
was placed on probation by the juvenile court; yet barely ten months
1 Omo REV. CODE § 2151.41 declares in part: "No person shall ... aid, abet, in-
duce, cause, encourage, or contribute to the ... delinquency of a child or a ward of thejuvenile court, or act in a way tending to cause delinquency in such child." The fore-
runner of § 2151.41, Omo GEN. CODE § 1639-45, was held sufficiently certain and uni-
form in operation to meet constitutional standards. State v. Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48,
123 NE.2d 438 (1953), appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio St. 112, 120 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
The language of these two sections is so close that a similar ruling under § 2151.41
would no doubt result today.
The offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is purely statutory. Annot.,
84 A.L.R.2d 1254, 1255 (1962). Today forty-eight states hold parents criminally
liable for contributing to the delinquency of their child; only Delaware and Vermont
do not. Kenny & Kenny, Shall We Punish the Parents?, 47 A.BA.J. 804, 805 (1961).
For a state-by-state analysis of this type of legislation, see Ludwig, Delinquent Parents
and the Criminal Law, 5 VANe. L REV. 719, 737-45 (1952). See also Geis, Con-
tributing to Delinquency, 8 ST. Louis L. REV. 59 (1963); Young, Charges Against
Adult Offenders in the Juvenile Court, 32 Omo BAR 224 (1959).
2 State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 330, 212 N.E.2d 635, 637 (1965).
34 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d 635 (1965).
4 The Supreme Court of the United States generally admits the prerogative of a
state, pursuant to its police power, to restrict certain types of speech that are beyond con-
stitutional protection: "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." They are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is dearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Other types of speech are
protected by the Constitution unless the expression presents "grave and immediate dan-
ger to interests which the State may lawfully protect." West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). Mr. Justice Brandeis has said: "The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to
the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime
are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgement of the rights
of free speech and assembly." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (con-
carring opinion).
5 The prevailing view is that a provision of the Bill of Rights that is enforced against
the states under the fourteenth amendment is enforced according to the same standards
as against federal encroachment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964). See 15
W. REs. L Rnv. 797, 799-800 (1964). This is most emphatically the case with the
first amendment. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1964), noted in 16
W. RES. L. REV. 780 (1965).
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later the girl gave birth to her third child. Consequently, the delin-
quent girl was committed to an industrial school, and, on the basis
of Mrs. McLaughlin's instructions to her daughter regarding the
prevention of pregnancy before marriage, a juvenile court jury found
Mrs. McLaughlin guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor.'
Although it might have been possible for the Ohio Court of
Appeals to set aside Mrs. McLaughlin's conviction without reaching
the constitutional' issue,' the court based its decision upon several
of the "first amendment tests" which were developed by the United
States Supreme Court in a long line of sedition and anti-communist
cases. In State v. McLaughlin,8 it was necessary to proceed largely
without the aid of precedent;9 therefore, it is significant that the
Ohio Court of Appeals set an example of using the Supreme Court's
"dear and present danger" and "balancing" tests to determine
whether Ohio, in the exercise of its police power, might lawfully
6 State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 328, 212 N.E.2d 635, 636 (1965).
7 A portion of the Ohio Court of Appeals' holding stated that "the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, since there is no evidence showing that what was
said and done actually had any effect on the acts of the child." State v. McLaughlin,
4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 335, 212 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1965). This indicates that the state
failed to prove a causal relation between Mrs. McLaughlin's words and her daughter's
delinquent conduct. The fact that the girl's first pregnancy preceded Mrs. Mclaughlin's
birth prevention advice tends to negate the existence of a causal relation. Only if the
mother's words were not an admonition against sexual behavior but were actually an
invitation to have intercourse as long as the girl prevented pregnancy could the mother
be said to have induced the child's delinquency.
84 Ohio App. 2d 327, 212 N.E.2d 635 (1965).
9 Research disclosed no case in any American jurisdiction holding parents criminally
responsible for having counseled their offspring in matters of birth prevention. If
some prosecutions have been pressed forward under a statute similar to OHIo REV.
CODE 5 2151.41, then the customary lack of funds among parents convicted of contrib-
uting to the delinquency of their children may account for the infrequent appeals in
this area and hence for the paucity of such cases in official reports. Ludwig, supra note
1, at 726. Prosecution might be founded upon statutes regulating the dissemination of
birth control information; sixteen states, Ohio excluded, have these statutes at the pres-
ent time. See 17 W. REs. L. REV. 601, 606 n.38 (1965). It should be noted, however,
that conviction of parents for advising their children regarding birth preventive methods
might be set aside not only on free speech grounds but also as a matter of public policy.
For example, New York has held that no cause of action for maliciously procuring an-
other to breach a contract can exist against a parent who advised his child to disaffirm a
contract; public policy dictated that parents should have an absolute right freely to ad-
vise their infant children with regard to all matters, and such a right should not subject
the parent to an inquiry as to motive. Lee v. Silver, 262 App. Div. 149, 28 N.Y.S.2d
333, aft'd, 287 N.Y. 575, 38 N.E.2d 233 (1941). Moreover, courts might adhere to
the Arizona Supreme Court position that legislation regulating the dissemination of
birth control information does not make the expression of those general ideas criminal
nor does it prohibit person-to-person disclosure of devices and techniques. Planned
Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 239, 375 P.2d 719, 725 (1962).
See generally Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 955 (1964); 12 AM. JuJL 2d Birth Control §§ 2-5
(1964).
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abridge Mrs. McLaughlin's constitutionally guaranteed right to free-
dom of speech. The applicability of the first of these tests was sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's statement that "where an offense is
specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction
relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sus-
tained only when the speech or publication created a 'clear and
present danger' of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited.
crime....10
The Ohio Court of Appeals reasoned that the words which were
spoken could possibly have contributed to further delinquent acts on
the daughter's part. However, since there was no evidence of any
affirmative acts by the mother other than the words she spoke, it
was held that the danger that Mrs. McLaughlin's advice to her
daughter might have induced the girl to engage in future sexual
activity was not sufficiently imminent to warrant state criminal sanc-
tion."
In 1949 Professor Paul Freund expressed his discontent with
the traditional "clear and present danger" rule as applied to govern-
mental regulation of speech. He felt that in addition to the immi-
nence of the danger, the courts should consider, among other factors,
the gravity of the threatened evil, the availability of more moderate
controls than those imposed by the state, the relative seriousness of
the danger as compared with the value of the speech, 2 and the
ODennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951). The doctrine was first
enunciated by M&. Justice Holmes. In speaking for a unanimous Court, he asserted:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In some
later cases the Court failed effectively to use the "clear and present danger" test, and,
accordingly, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, as in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). When a majority of the Court refused to follow the test
in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), both Justices again dissented. Id. at
672. But subsequent cases vindicated the Holmes-Brandeis formula. See, e.g., Wood
v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). In the
Wood case it was determined that the state lacked the power to punish a sheriff for
contempt because of his public criticism of the grand jury. In deciding that the sheriffs
speech created no clear and present danger to the administration of justice, the Court
adopted the view that the danger must not be remote or even probable; instead, it must
immediately imperil. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 385 (1962). See generally
KoNVnz, FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS 333-35 (1963). For an authorative discus-
sion of the tests which have developed in order to determine the scope of first amend-
ment protection against state and federal abridgement of free speech, see Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1965).
11 State v. McLaughlin, 4 Ohio App. 2d 327, 334-35, 212 N.E.2d 635, 640 (1965).
12 Of course, under a correct interpretation of the traditional "dear and present
danger" test, not every evil which might be absolutely certain to occur is one of those
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specific intent with which the words were spoken. "No matter how
rapidly we utter the phrase 'dear and present danger,' or how closely
we hyphenate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing
of values."'" Accordingly, in 1951 the Supreme Court re-interpreted
the "clear and present danger" test in Dennis v. United States; 4 Pro-
fessor Freund's suggestions were incorporated into Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion.'5  The new "balancing of interest" test
reads as follows: "In each case [courts] . . . must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."' 6  This
might well be denominated the "dear and probable evil" test be-
cause it does not require that the evil be one which is likely to occur
without delay; rather, it is sufficient that the evil be likely to occur
sometime in the future, provided that the public necessity for pre-
venting the evil outweighs the public and private interest in protect-
ing free speech.'7
The Ohio Court of Appeals may have felt that the gravity of
the evil was largely discounted by the improbability that Mrs. Mc-
Laughlin's words tended to induce her daughter's delinquent conduct.
The court may also have given some weight to the absence of a
specific intent on the mother's part to encourage her daughter's sex-
ual activity and to the inhibiting effect the lower court's decision
could have upon parental guidance in matters of sex and birth con-
trol. It is worthy of note that, heretofore, the "balancing" test had
been applied to the detriment of free speech only when the threaten-
ing evil was a communist conspiracy to advocate the violent over-
"substantive evils that Congress [or the state] has a right to prevent" by the abridge-
ment of free speech. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The test
which had its genesis in the Scbenck case should be applied with regard to whether
the interest which the state is attempting to protect is itself too insubstantial to justify
restriction of speech. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). See, e.g.,
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
13 FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1951).
14341 U.S. 494 (1951).
15 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 543 (1951).
16 Id. at 510. In Dennis the Court was squarely presented with the application of
the "clear and present danger" rule and was forced to decide what that phrase signified.
The Court resolved to adopt a statement of the rule which was articulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand in the court below. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). For a thorough commentary on the
evolution of the "clear and present danger" rule, see Mendelson, Clear and Present Dan-
ger - From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952); Mendelson, Clear
and Present Danger - Another Decade, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 449 (1961).
17 See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212-13 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
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